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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the role of the nowadays Eurozone institutional setup in fostering the ongoing 
peripheral Euro countries’ sovereign debt crisis. According to the Modern Money Theory, we stress that 
the lack of a federal European government running anti-cyclical fiscal policy, the loss of monetary 
sovereignty by Euro Member States and the lack of a lender-of-last-resort central bank has significantly 
contributed to generate, amplify and protract the present crisis. In particular, we present a post-
Keynesian Eurozone center-periphery model through which we show how, due to the incomplete nature 
of Eurozone institutions with respect to a full-fledged federal union, diverging trends and conflicting 
claims have emerged between center and peripheral Euro countries in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
financial meltdown. We emphasize two points. (i) Diverging trends and conflicting claims among Euro 
countries may represent a decisive obstacle to reform Eurozone towards a complete federal entity. 
However, they may prove to be self-defeating in the long run should financial turbulences seriously 
deepen also in large peripheral countries. (ii) Austerity packages alone do not address the core point of 
the Eurozone crisis. They could have sense only if included in a much wider reform agenda, whose final 
purpose is the creation of a federal European government which can run expansionary fiscal stances and 
of a government banker. In this sense, the unlimited bond-buying program recently launched by the 
European Central Banks is interpreted as a positive although mild step in the right direction out of the 
extreme monetarism which has so far shaped Eurozone institutions. 
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1. Conflicting interests in the Eurozone? 
 
From mid 2010 on, large part of the economic debate has devoted increasing efforts to explain 
the causes of the current Eurozone crisis. Different opinions, with some overlaps among them, 
have emerged. Some economists indentify EU Member States’ fiscal profligacy as the root of 
the crisis (Kosters, 2009; Panetta, 2011; Weidmann, 2012; ECB, 2012). Others stress the 
                                                        
♣ Mediterranean University of Reggio Calabria, Department of History, Law, Social and Economic Sciences, and 
University of Pavia. Research Fellow at Medalics, Research Center for Mediterranean Relations, via del Torrione 
95, Reggio Calabria, Italy. Email: abotta@eco.unipv.it. 
 2 
existence of a Balance-of-Payments problem among Eurozone countries (Hein, Trucker and 
van Treek, 2011; Perez-Caldentey and Vernengo 2012; Bilbow, 2012). Others, finally, 
emphasize that Eurozone is not an optimal currency area and that the existing crisis is 
nothing but the consequence of Eurozone difficulties to deal with asymmetric shocks 
(Krugman, 2012). 
Inside this debate, a pretty relevant and transversal strand of thought describes Eurozone 
difficulties, and the crisis of peripheral economies in particular, as closely similar to the crises 
faced by several developing countries in the decades after 1982 (De Grauwe, 2011; Soros, 
2012).  According to this perspective, the creation of the monetary union has induced 
increasing financial flows to take place inside Europe. Once eliminated the exchange rate risk 
usually associated to allegedly unreliable Southern European countries, capitals have 
massively flown towards them (Waysard, Ross and de Guzman, 2010; Perez-Caldentey and 
Vernengo 2012; Lin and Treichel, 2012). As a consequence, interest rate differentials with 
respect to (presumed) more virtuous central Euro countries have mostly disappeared. 
Economic convergence between peripheral and central economies has shown up.  
The 2007-2008 financial meltdown has abruptly changed this picture. Economic recession has 
affected all EU Member States. Economic downturns, however, have been particularly severe 
in Spain and Ireland, where previous enthusiastic economic performances were largely based 
on unsustainable housing bubbles. Their national governments, examples of rigorous fiscal 
discipline until that point (Council of the European Union, 2007a; 2007b), have had to come in 
to bail out financial institutions and provide relief from mounting unemployment. Spanish 
and Irish fiscal deficits and public debts have soared. In the case of Greece (and partially 
Italy), the problems connected to a pretty high public debt stock have started to obsess 
financial markets. Thanks to the existence of a common currency, capitals have suddenly 
changed direction. Financial operators have started to sell risky peripheral countries’ bonds 
and buy safer central countries’ Treasure Bills. Accordingly, center-periphery convergence 
has left the stage to widening diversities. Peripheral countries, interest rates have increased 
hugely, worsening even more their financial picture. Economic activity in the periphery has 
plumbed compared to the weak but positive performance of central economies. 
Given this dismal scenario, which is the way out? The answer to this question mostly depends 
on the analysis of the causes of the crisis. In line with the idea that the current crisis is 
consequence of past irresponsible fiscal policies, most international institutions identify fiscal 
consolidation as the only solution to Eurozone problems. Debtor countries must pay their 
debt. To do so, they have to implement tough austerity packages. To ease the accomplishment 
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of this task, peripheral economies have also to launch ambitious structural reform programs. 
There are no precise definitions of what structural reforms actually mean. The general 
understanding, however, is that economic growth depends on supply-side factors. Therefore, 
the privatization of inefficient public enterprises, the downsize of muddled public 
bureaucracy and the liberalization of goods and labor markets are the measures to adopt to 
increase the efficiency of the overall economic system and unleash economic growth. In this 
picture, there is any role for demand-side factors to play. 
There is widespread consensus among economists on the fact that productivity gaps and unit 
labor cost divergence are relevant causes of external account imbalances among central and 
peripheral Euro countries (De Grauwe, 2012). One the one hand, these disequilibria are 
somehow consequences of the process of monetary unification and financial integration 
described above. On the other hand, their solution seems to be hindered by the existence of 
the common Euro currency itself. Actually, in front of deep recessions, an exchange rate 
devaluation could help peripheral economies to bring back growth by encouraging exports; to 
eliminate external vulnerability by favoring Balance-of-Payments current account surpluses 
instead of deficits; to ensure fiscal solidity through growth-led increases in tax revenues and 
reductions in counter-cyclical expenditures. The loss of monetary sovereignty, however, put 
further strain on their adjustment process by depriving them of the exchange rate as policy 
tool. It is on the base of these arguments that an increasing number of experts, financial 
commentators and policy makers indicate the perhaps temporary exit of some Euro countries 
from the monetary union as the best, although costly, solution to the existing crisis (Roubini, 
2011; Allen and Ngai, 2012; Miller and Skidelsky, 2012; Becker and Posner, 2012).  
Even though some points of the previous analyses cannot  be neglected, we are pretty 
skeptical about their effectiveness. Actually, the shortcomings of a simple austerity-centered 
strategy appear to be clear. On the one hand, fiscal problems in peripheral economies seem to 
persist due to a vicious spiral between fiscal restrictions, deepening economic recession and 
the need for further public balance corrections. On the other hand, it is pretty hard to 
understand how the structural reforms could help peripheral economies to end recession and 
reduce unemployment, given that these problems seem to mainly have a cyclical demand-side 
nature instead of a structural supply-side one.  
As to the exit/devaluation strategy, the literature on contractionary devaluation comes at 
mind, according to which exchange rate devaluation may even deepen recession instead of 
alleviating it depending on the productive structure and aggregate demand composition of 
devaluating countries (Taylor, 1991). Actually, this may well be the case of Greece and 
 4 
Portugal, i.e. relatively closed economies with pretty underdeveloped productive systems. 
Moreover, even admitting a positive effect of regained monetary independence on the 
economic performance of devaluating economies, we still doubt this event could solve the 
problems of a, let say, narrower Euro-zone. First, the abandon of the common currency by 
some European countries may do not have destructive effects on the remaining Eurozone 
insofar as such an exit strategy is restricted to small Member States like Greece, Portugal, 
perhaps Ireland1. Things would change dramatically in the case of much larger economies 
such as Spain and Italy2. Second, the likely  emergence of contagion phenomena and 
speculative forces betting on the next country exiting Eurozone is to consider. We all know 
how powerful is financial speculation and its possibly devastating effects on the likelihood of 
the Euro project to survive.   
In line with these observations, we think that the crucial point of the current crisis lies in the 
incomplete nature of the nowadays Euro building. First, the lack of a federal European fiscal 
policy carried out by a federal European government leaves Member States alone in their 
efforts to counteract economic recession. The absence of any fiscal transfer between (non-
existing) federal institutions and national governments simply increases the debt burden of 
Member countries and the doubts about their sustainability. Second, but jointly with the 
previous point, the abandon of a national currency in favor of the common Euro currency has 
induced Member States to issue debt in a currency they do not control. According to the well-
known Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), this fact seriously exposes Member States to default, 
hence the current financial turbulences (Papadimitriou and Wray, 2012). These would not 
take place in monetary sovereign economies with a full-fledged lender-of-last resort central 
bank such as UK or USA (De Grauwe, 2011).  
More in general, all the above lacks in the original design of the European monetary union 
create or induce to perceive diverging trends and conflicting interests among Eurozone 
countries in presence of common (and not asymmetric), although with different intensity, 
adverse economic shocks. Since the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, Eurozone 
                                                        
1 In 2010, the real GDP of Greece, Portugal and Ireland represented, respectively, the 2.31 percent, 1.92 percent 
and 1.86 percent of Eurozone real GDP. In terms of trade statistics, in 2010, Greece accounted to a mere 0.62 
percent of Germany’s world exports, this data being equal to 0.82 percent and 0.44 percent in the case of 
Portugal and Ireland.   
2 In 2010, Italy and Spain were, respectively, the third and fourth largest economies in the Eurozone, their real 
GDP being equal to 16.52 percent and 11.22 percent of Eurozone GDP. According to data from UNCTAD, in 2010, 
more than 6 percent of all Germany’s exports were directed towards Italy (i.e. the third largest Germany trade 
partner in the Euro-zone after France and Netherlands). This data was equal to 3.58 percent in the case of Spain. 
Besides this real-side aspects, also financial relations are to consider. Actually, financial links between Germany 
and Italy and Spain are far more relevant and stronger than those with all the other small peripheral Eurozone 
economies (see later on this point).    
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peripheral economies are suffering protracted financial instability whilst central economies, 
regardless of their effective financial solidity, are benefitting of never-before-seen low interest 
rates. Even more, whilst the former are stuck in an endless hurry to implement austerity 
packages that rising debt service costs may easily frustrate, the latter can safely pursue fiscal 
stabilization thanks to close-to-zero, or even negative, real interest rates. Finally, whilst 
peripheral economies likely need some expansionary, perhaps inflationist, monetary policy by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and fiscal support from European institutions, central 
countries call for rigorous anti-inflationist monetary/fiscal policies to preserve their external 
competitiveness and their, let say, mercantilist-type export-led growth pattern. It is now easy 
to see that these differences can easily persuade economists and national policy makers from 
central economies that peripheral countries have to solve existing problems by their own. 
After all, central countries may argue, why should we provide any additional financial help or 
undertake expansionary measures to support recovery in the periphery given the amount of 
resources already conceded to them and the pretty well performance of our economic 
systems3? Further, the above divergences can work to impede or delay any serious attempt to 
end the present crisis by reforming European institutions in the direction of a federal 
European fiscal union with a true lender-of-last-resort central bank. 
In this paper we stress that reforming European institutions towards the creation of a 
complete federal political union with a federal fiscal policy and full monetary sovereignty is 
the decisive step ahead to solve the Eurozone crisis. Accordingly, all the euro-skeptic feelings 
which take strength from the above divergences likely represent the worst threat to the 
survival of the Euro project. Indeed, they may prove to be narrow-minded and dramatically 
wrong in case of a collapse of the European monetary union. Also apparently invulnerable 
central Member States would likely suffer severe hardship and no center-periphery diverging 
interests would persist any longer in case of an unraveling Euro-zone. In the following 
sections, we try to formally address this point through a simple Eurozone center-periphery 
model. In doing this, we will distinguish between a big center-small periphery context and a 
big center-big periphery framework.  
 
 
 
                                                        
3 In this sense, the words released by German Minister for Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle in a recent 
interview to Focus Magazine are pretty clear: “Too much solidarity could also cause Europe to fail, if we demand 
too much of ourselves and too little willingness to reform from others (Focus Online, 4th august 2012)”.  
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2. The Model 
 
Consider two countries, a well developed center and a relatively less developed periphery. 
They share the same currency and they have delegated monetary policy to a common central 
bank. Despite these common elements, the two countries maintain complete fiscal 
independence. Actually, they are responsible by their own for any fiscal policy aiming to 
regulate economic cycles, as well as all measures and fiscal aspects concerning pension 
system, social security, and the provision of public services such as healthcare and education. 
Fiscal deficits are financed by issuing national Treasury bonds denominated in the same Euro 
currency. According to the nowadays Eurozone framework, there is any federal fiscal 
authority which has the right to impose taxes, makes expenditures and collect financial 
resources by issuing federal government bills.  
Into this context, equations (1) and (2) below define the growth rates of the center and the 
periphery along Keynesian lines, i.e. as a function of autonomous demand injections: 
 
 =   , 	 , 
 ,  4                                                                                   (1) 
 
 =   , 	 , 
 ,                                                                                       (2) 
 
Expression (1) simply tells us that current economic performance of the center economy (gC) 
positively depends on current domestic government expenditures (GC), current net exports 
(EXC) and total investment (IC)5.  
In the post-Keynesian tradition and according to the endogenous monetary theory, 
investment does not come from savings. On the one hand, investment depends on 
entrepreneurs’ animal spirits demanding loans from banks in order to finance their projects. 
On the other hand, investment is affected by banks’ credit policies. Credit conditions, we 
know, contribute to define what is usually labeled as the effective demand for credit and are 
                                                        
4 In a more realistic discrete time model, let define current output (Yt) in this way:  = 
 +  + 	, where 
“m” stands for the Keynesian multiplier. Reminding that  = 1 + , we can modify the formula above to 
express gt, i.e. the annual growth rate of GDP at time t, as:  =  +   + !"!". In our formulation,  ,  and !"  are the annual growth rate of total investment (I), public expenditures (G) and economy’s exports 
(EX); ηI, ηG and ηEX are the corresponding shares on domestic GDP (here, for the sake of simplicity, assumed as 
constant). It goes without saying that, ceteris paribus, the higher It, Gt and/or EXt, the higher the resulting growth 
rate and the performance of the economy as a whole.   
5 The formalization in equations (1) and (2) of the real GDP growth closely resembles that adopted by Lavoie 
(2006). 
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highly influenced by the soundness of banks assets. Accordingly, equation (1) assumes that 
economic growth in the center is indirectly affected, through the investment channel, by the 
prices of center government’s bonds () which, in turn, depends negatively on its own 
interest rates iC. Actually, changing prices of center government’s bonds will alter the solidity 
of banks balance sheets and therefore their credit policy. Investment demand will inevitably 
be affected by easing or, as is currently going on, tightening conditions on the credit market. 
Equation (1) also emphasizes that periphery government’s bonds, and not only center 
government’s bonds, may influence banks’ credit policy in the center. Indeed, before the 
outbreak of the current crisis, central economy banks have largely provided loans to 
peripheral economies. They are now exposed to the risk of default in the periphery. This event 
may have significant effects on the functioning of the credit market and of the economy as a 
whole in central Euro Member States6. 
Equation (2) gives us the GDP growth rate in the periphery. Its economic meaning is exactly 
equivalent to that of equation (1). According to the data provided by the most relevant 
international financial institutions, peripheral Euro countries are net receivers of foreign 
capitals, in particular from central Euro countries, and are net debtors on international 
financial markets. Yet, big peripheral economies such as Spain and Italy have also 
accumulated significant asset positions in the center. According to Waysard, Ross and de 
Guzman (2010), at the end of 2008 Italian institutions’ assets in Germany amounted to 196 
billion Dollars, i.e. the 8 percent of Italian GDP and 5,6 percent of German GDP. In the same 
period, Spanish asset holdings in Germany worth 88 billion Dollars, that is the 5 percent and 
2,5 percent of Spanish and German GDP respectively. In light of these facts, in equation (2) we 
assume both peripheral and central bonds to be in the balance sheets of peripheral banks and 
therefore to influence, via banks’ credit policy, domestic investment IP. While this aspect will 
be neglected when considering center-peripheral dynamics in case of small peripheral 
countries, such an intertwined financial structure will prove to be fundamental to explain the 
co-evolution of central and big peripheral Euro countries. 
In equations (1) and (2), interest rates iC and iP are influenced by parameters σC and σP,  
respectively. In our model, they stand for country-specific financial risk indicators which 
financial operators assign to assets issued by Eurozone countries (in this case government 
bonds only). Parameter σC represents the peculiar risk perceived by financial markets in 
acquiring central economy government’s bonds. Parameter σP, instead, grasps all the country-
                                                        
6 In equation (1),   stands for the market price of periphery government’s bonds and iP is the connected interest 
rate. 
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specific factors taken into account by financial investors when buying peripheral 
government’s bonds. Such country-specific factors obviously influence the remuneration 
gained on central and peripheral economy bonds’ holdings. In particular, they determine the 
spread between the central(peripheral) economy government bonds’ interest rate iC(iP) and 
the interest rate i* associated to, say, a riskless financial activity such as US government 
Treasury Bills. This point is modeled in equations (3) and (4) below.7 
  = ∗ +                                                                                                                                                           (3) 
  = ∗ +                                                                                                                                                          (4) 
 
Inflation is sometimes considered a possible way to follow by economic authorities in order to 
stabilize, or possibly reduce, too-high debt-to-GDP ratios. In this model, we formalize inflation 
at  Euro-country level in a pretty standard accelerationist fashion: 
 $ = $ + % − '                                                                                                                                    (5) 
 $ = $ + ( − '                                                                                                                                    (6) 
 
Equation (5) tells us that the current inflation rate in the center πC is equal to the inflation 
target $  established by the common European Central Bank in case current growth gC is 
equal to the central economy full-employment growth rate '. Should gC be higher(lower) 
than ', inflation in the center will be higher(lower) than the long-run average inflation rate 
pursued by European monetary authorities. The same line of reasoning applies to equation 
(6), which gives us current inflation in the periphery πP. In equation (6), ' now stands for 
potential growth in the periphery8. Parameters ψ and χ represent the sensitivity of inflation 
dynamics to output gap in the center and in the periphery respectively. 
                                                        
7 Actually, according to the uncovered interest rate parity, if we assume US Treasury Bills as a sort of third-party 
riskless financial activity, interest rate spreads with respect to Euro governments’ bonds should also take into 
account the Euro-Dollar exchange rate risk. For the sake of simplicity, in this model we neglect this point. We do 
this in order to stress the relevance of intra-Eurozone financial transactions among different Euro countries’ 
bonds instead of capital flights from Eurozone assets towards third-countries’ financial activities. In this sense, it 
is worth noting the pretty small devaluation of Euro with respect Dollar in spite of the considerable distress 
afflicting financial European markets since 2010.       
8 In this model, we define gn as the growth rate of real GDP consistent with the full utilization of available 
resources, in particular the domestic labor force, and given the growth rate of labor productivity. In this paper, 
for the sake of simplicity, we do not explicitly model the technological long-run factors and the cyclical ones 
 9 
Equations (1)-to-(6) set the, let say, instantaneous values of some relevant economic variables 
such as gC(gP), iC(iP), πC(πP). In this model, however, our concern is mainly on diverging trends 
(and the ensuing conflicting interests) among center and peripheral Euro countries. The word 
“trend” recall us some sort of dynamics in economic variables. The dynamic side of this model 
is encapsulated in the set of equations (7)-(10) reported below. In line with the aim of the 
paper, here we focus on, say, financial variables. In particular, we model the evolution of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio in both the central and peripheral economy, as well as the dynamics of the 
country-specific risk indicators σC and σP. We do this due to the mounting emphasis on debt-
to-GDP ratios as fundamental signals of public balance solidity of the various Euro countries. 
The same logic applies to country-specific risk indicators and therefore to Euro country 
interest rate spreads, which have probably assured as the most observed economic variables 
by common people, economists, policy makers and financial operators in the last two years. 
Equations (7) and (8) give us the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio dC9 and of the country-
specific financial risk indicator σC in the center: 
 *+ = *,- − $ −  = * .Ω01010 +  − $ − 1 + % + %'2                                              (7) 
 + = 3* − *444*∗ , 5                                                                                                                        (8) 
With *444 = *∗  if 5 = 0; *444 > *∗  if 5 > 0 
 
Equation (7) reads that the time derivative of the central economy debt-to-GDP ratio *+  is a 
positive function of the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio Ω*. In this model, we assume ΩC to be 
a negative function of the debt-to-GDP ratio dC. Actually, perhaps influenced by the apparently 
worldwide run against public debt, the higher dC, the stronger the political pressures to 
squeeze primary deficits and possibly obtain primary surpluses, hence the negative 
relationship between ΩC and dC. Further, public debt-to-GDP dynamics in the center is 
positively affected by the interest rate iC. The higher iC, the higher the service costs of 
outstanding debt and therefore new debt issuances. 
In equation (7), the inflation target πT set by the European Central Bank has a negative impact 
on the dynamics of the central economy debt-to-GDP ratio. According to equation (5), ceteris 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
affecting the evolution of the potential growth rate. For more details on this point, see León-Ledesma and 
Thirwall (2002), Lavoie (2006). 
9 dC is defined as DC/PCYC. DC stands for the stock of public debt in the center, PC is the overall economy price level 
and YC central economy real GDP. In equation (7), ,- is the percentage variation in center economy’s debt stock.   
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paribus, the higher πT, the higher the inflation rate in the center and therefore its nominal 
GDP. Stabilization or reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio would likely be easier. The current 
growth rate gC shows a similarly negative effect on dC. On the one hand, economic growth 
directly influences the debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics by increasing domestic real GDP YC. On the 
other hand, it may also trigger off a indirect effect by possibly leading to higher inflation (see 
equation (5)). Finally, the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the center is influenced 
positively by the potential growth rate '. Ceteris paribus, the higher ' and the connected 
output gap, the lower will be domestic inflation or, even worse, the higher the risk to give rise 
to deflation. A dangerous Fisher-type debt-deflation process could take place, destabilizing 
the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Equation (8) tries to model how financial operators may periodically update the financial risk 
indicator attached to the center. We assume the central economy financial risk indicator to be 
revised by confronting the outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio dC with some benchmark level *444. 
According to equation (8), should dC be higher(lower) than the benchmark level *444, financial 
operators will increase(reduce) the financial risk indicator associated to central economy 
government’s bonds, so that + > 0 (+ < 0). Parameter β stands for the sensitivity of 
financial operator feelings to any gap between current debt-to-GDP ratio and the benchmark 
level *444. 
In equation (8), the benchmark debt-to-GDP ratio *444 plays a leading role in modifying 
financial operators’ feelings towards central economy government bonds. How do financial 
operators set such kind of target? In our model, we assume *444  to depend positively on two 
factors: *∗  and εP. First, *∗  stands for the equilibrium level of the debt-to-GDP ratio consistent 
with the economy growing at full potential. Other way round, *∗  represents a sort of long-run 
equilibrium level of the debt-to-GDP ratio once the economy has achieved its potential growth 
rate ' and, consequently, primary deficit (or surplus) is at its structural level. The full-
employment debt-to-GDP ratio may be defined according to the expression below: 
 
*∗ = Ω∗' + $ − ∗ −  
 
Where Ω∗  is the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio at its structural level. 
It times of financial stability, without any bad news from the center and, more relevantly, from 
the periphery of the Eurozone (i.e. εP=0), we assume financial operators to set the benchmark 
level *444 equal to the long-run full-employment debt-to-GDP ratio *∗ . In this case, financial 
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operators will upward revise the financial risk indicator σC only if current debt-to-GDP ratio is 
higher that its long-run expected value *∗ . The most recent experience, however, tell us that 
financial operators do not only take into account domestic factors to evaluate financial risk in 
the center. In times of financial distress, also external factors may come to play a leading role. 
Actually, the Eurozone crisis clearly witnesses that bad news from the periphery can strongly 
influence investment portfolio decisions and induce capitals to suddenly leave the periphery 
in search for a safe heaven in the center. Such capital flights can often be seen as irrational and 
de-linked from the effective financial solidity of allegedly safe central Euro countries10. 
Nonetheless, they are at the basis of the surge in interest rate spreads between central 
government bonds and peripheral Treasury Bills. In equation (8), term εP precisely aims to get 
this point. In particular, if we imagine some bad news coming from the periphery, i.e. a deeper 
economic recession than elsewhere or low space for anti-cyclical policies due to already high 
levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio, term εP will assume positive values. This will lead financial 
operators to increase the benchmark level *444. Regardless from the effective gap between dC 
and *∗ , financial markets will move capitals away from the periphery and towards the center 
and possibly reduce the financial risk factor σC and the interest rate iC associated to central 
economy bonds. 
Equations (9) and (10) correspond to equations (7) and (8), now referred to the periphery:       
 *+ = *,- − $ −  = * .Ω91919 +  − $ − 1 + ( + %'2                                             (9) 
 + = :* − *444*∗ , 5                                                                                                                     (10) 
With *444 = *∗  if 5 = 0; *444 < *∗  if 5 > 0 
 
Equations (9) and (10) describe the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio dP and of the country 
risk factor σP in the periphery along similar lines to those assumed in the center. Note, 
however, a fundamental asymmetry with respect to financial risk dynamics in the center. 
Actually, adverse shocks hitting peripheral economies (i.e. 5 > 0) will be immediately passed 
through a value of *444 lover than *∗ . Accordingly, huge capital outflows will take place and the 
peripheral economy financial risk indicator σP will be revised upward. Again, this rough but 
simple formalization tries to model the perhaps biased eyes through which financial 
                                                        
10 According to data from IMF, in 2011, the Spanish debt-to-GDP ratio was equal to 68.5%. It was much lower 
than the same data from Belgium, Germany or even UK, and very close to the value associated to Netherland. 
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operators seem to look at economic events in central Euro countries and peripheral 
economies. 
Equations (7)-(8) and (9)-(10), if considered all together, give rise to a highly complex four-
equation dynamic system, whose stability should be assessed by taking into account all 
possible real-side and financial links between central and peripheral countries. In order to 
keep the dynamic analysis of the model as simple as possible, for the time being we prefer 
considering the sets of equations (7)-(8) and (9)-(10) as independent. In particular, we now 
assume equations (7)-(8) and (9)-(10) to be somehow connected only by the exogenous 
asymmetric response of financial markets to bad news in the periphery (i.e. factor εP in 
equations (8) and (10) above). Actually, we will return to the full four-by-four dynamic 
system later on, when analyzing center-periphery dynamics in case of a large and 
economically influential peripheral economy. Moreover, let now focus on the central economy 
dynamic system only11 and analyze the connected Jacobian matrix JC (evaluated at the steady 
state). We get: 
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As to the partial derivative ?*+ /?*, its sign is likely to be negative for low values of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio dC. In this case, in fact, a slight increase in dC may induce policy makers to 
cut primary deficit ΩC. At the same time, a bit higher value of dC would probably have any 
effect on current growth (i.e. 
GH0G10 = 0). Things may radically change at much higher values of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio. First, when dC is too high, reductions in primary deficits may prove to 
be too small and insufficient to stabilize public debt dynamics. Second, perhaps in presence of 
widespread fear among economic agents about public debt sustainability, economic 
performance may deteriorate and current growth decline, so that 
GH0G10 < 0. An unstable 
                                                        
11 Stability analysis of equations (9) and (10) is qualitatively equivalent to that of the dynamic system composed 
by equations (7) and (8). In the main text, we thus describe the center economy case only.      
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dynamics may thus emerge, possibly leading to higher and higher values of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and12. 
As to derivatives G10+GI0 and GI0+G10, there are no doubts about their positive signs. In particular, 
a higher financial risk σC will further complicate public debt management given that it will 
increase debt service costs and, at the same time, hamper current economic growth through 
the interest rate-investment nexus (see equation (1)). 
In the Jacobian matrix above, partial derivative GI0+GI0 will have a negative sign. Actually, 
ceteris paribus, an increase in the risk factor σC  will raise the long-run full-employment value 
of the debt-to-GDP ratio *∗ , which in turn will induce to revise downward σC. In a way, we 
may interpret this point as a self-stabilizing force in the dynamics of the country risk factor. 
The higher σC, the more difficult is it will newly increase next time. 
Graphically speaking, the dynamic system above and the set of equations describing how 
central economy works (but the same applies to the periphery) can be represented through 
the four-panel figure 1 below. 
The top-right panel portrays the two loci for constant values of the debt-to-GDP ratio dC and 
country risk factor σC. The *+ = 0 locus is represented by an inverted U-curve. The + = 0 
locus is an upward sloping curve with an horizontal asymptote when *444 = *∗ = Ω0∗H0JKLMN∗I0 = ∞. Further, we assume it to have and horizontal segment, with 
σC=0, when dC is lower than *I0PQ∗ = Ω0∗H0JKLMN∗. Note two intersection points, hence the 
possibility for multiple equilibria to exist13. Equilibrium A features a lower debt-to-GDP ratio 
dC1, a lower country-specific risk indicator σC1 and a higher growth rate gC1 than the records 
associated to equilibrium B. Further, whilst point A shows a stable dynamics in its 
neighborhoods, equilibrium B is unstable. In our mind, equilibrium B represents a sort of 
risky economic environment, the pre-crisis Greek context for instance, in which a temporary 
economic shock may well be enough to produce a right-to-left departure from the equilibrium 
and explosive dynamics in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In figure 1, for the sake of simplicity, we do 
not explicitly introduce any upper bound to the evolution of dC. Such a ceiling is however a 
concrete possibility in the case of Euro Member countries given the present European 
                                                        
12 See also Botta (2012) for more details on this point. 
13 The specific multiple-equilibria scenario portrayed in figure 1 is only one among many possible. In the second 
part of the paper, we will also consider the case in which no long-run equilibria exist. Actually, it may describe 
the possibly disastrous long-run consequences of the 2007-2008 financial meltdown on the financial stability of 
some peripheral Euro Member States.  
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institutional framework14. It thus makes sense to believe that a destabilizing right-to-left 
dynamics in figure 1 cannot continue indefinitely and that an upper limit will eventually bind, 
beyond which public debt will not be rolled over any longer and default (and debt 
restructuring) take place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
        
 
 
Figure 1 – Multiple long-run equilibria in the center 
 
Moving counter-clockwise in figure 1, the remaining panels describe the economic 
mechanisms connecting dC to gC. In the top-left panel we portray equation (3), whilst in the 
bottom-left panel we draw equation (1). In the bottom-right panel, finally, we explicitly match 
each other debt-to-GDP ratios and GDP growth rates associated to the long-run equilibria 
reported in the top-right quadrant. 
 
                                                        
14 Actually, the apparently endless increase in Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio may confirm that “Sovereigns do not 
default (Kregel, 2012)”. In the nowadays Euro framework, however, we all know how far Member countries are 
from being fully sovereign States.  
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3. Center-periphery divergence in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial meltdown 
 
Equations (7)-(8) and (9)-(10) describe debt-to-GDP ratios and country-specific risk factors 
to follow broadly similar adjustment rules in both the center and in the periphery. Yet 
important asymmetries exist in the way the two countries can face common economic shocks. 
We have already discussed the role of factor εP in equations (8) and (10). Some more points is 
worth stressing here. 
First, remarkable economic performances in peripheral Euro countries in the first half of the 
2000s until 2007 were largely fed by mounting housing booms. This emerges clearly from 
table 1 in the appendix of the paper, which reports data on the sectoral structural composition 
and financial solidity of various Euro economies. Note the relevance of the construction sector 
(as a percentage of GDP) in countries such as Spain and Ireland, and, in a lesser extent, Greece, 
compared to what registered in central economies. We all know that, since 2007, the housing 
sector has been in the eyes of the storm. On the one hand, this has implied longer and 
sometimes deeper economic downturn in peripheral countries than elsewhere. On the other 
hand, peripheral governments have had to massively intervene to avoid the collapse of the 
financial system and provide safety net against widespread unemployment, with the ensuing 
higher-than-abroad burden on public finances.  
Second, several peripheral countries still present relatively underdeveloped productive 
systems, at least with respect to the center. This is clear in the case of Greece and Portugal. In 
both countries, manufacturing amounts to far less than 15 percent of domestic GDP and a 
process of early deindustrialization seem having taken place. Further, these economies are 
poorly integrated on international markets and show a pretty low propensity to export15. On 
the one hand, this fact can be interpreted as a sign of lack of competitiveness of their 
productive patterns and provide an explanation for their difficulties to bring back growth 
soon by exploiting world recovery. On the other hand, it mirrors the net external debt position 
plaguing Greece and Portugal among the other peripheral countries. 
Third, peripheral and central Euro countries show opposite positions on international 
financial markets. Since the beginning of 2000s, peripheral Euro countries have recorded 
significant Balance-of-Payments current account deficits and increasing net external debt 
stocks. On the contrary, most central Euro countries have registered large trade and current 
account surpluses. By the end of 2010, their foreign assets outstripped by far foreign 
                                                        
15 In 2010, Greek exports represented a mere 21 percent of GDP. In the overall Euro area, total exports stands at 
the 40 percent of Eurozone GDP. 
 16
liabilities. In times of financial distress, it makes a big difference being net creditor rather than 
net debtor on financial markets. Actually, peripheral Euro countries are highly exposed to 
capital flights and sudden stops, which can easily trigger off liquidity and, even worst, 
insolvency crises. This is particularly true inside EMU, in which liquidity can safely dry up in 
the periphery and move to the center without bearing any exchange rate risk. Central Euro 
countries, on the contrary, now appear as safe heaven to financial investors and their financial 
markets are plenty of liquidity, with obvious positive consequences in terms of financial 
stimuli to economic recovery.  
Together with points 1 and 2, such financial markets’ asymmetric response to economic 
shocks in central and peripheral countries is a core issue of this paper and the central point 
upon which the role of factor εP in equations (8) and (9) hinges on. Let try to see more 
formally the long-run consequences of such asymmetries both into a big center-small 
periphery setting and into a big center-big periphery context in the aftermath of the 2007-
2008 financial meltdown. 
 
3.1 The big centre-small periphery case 
Imagine to deal with a large central economy, let say Germany, and a small peripheral country, 
Greece or Portugal for instance. Even further, on the basis of the simplifications introduced 
before, imagine that economic links between the two countries are pretty weak. First, center 
exports to the periphery amount to a negligible proportion of total central economy exports, 
so that we can assume  GH0G!"0 G!"0G!"0→S9 = 0 16. Even though the opposite might be true in the 
periphery in a general center-periphery model, inside the Eurozone small peripheral 
countries do not seem to have tight trade relationships with central economies. Accordingly, 
let apply the above assumption also in the case of the periphery17. Second, even though we 
assume overall financial markets’ response to bad news in the periphery and center-
periphery capital flights to have significant economic consequences, imagine direct reciprocal 
center-periphery financial relationships to be negligible in case of a small peripheral 
                                                        
16 EXC→SP stands for export of the center towards the small peripheral Euro country. 
17 In 2011, Greek exports towards Germany amounted to 7,74 percent of total Greek exports. Due to the scarce 
incidence exports have on Greek GDP, we can reasonable assume that Greek exports to Germany represent a 
negligible demand injection to domestic growth. The same line of reasoning broadly applies to Ireland, where 
exports towards Germany represented a bit less than 7 percent of total Irish exports in 2011. In the case of 
Portugal, this value increases to 12 percent. In the same year, total exports represented only the 30 percent of 
Portuguese GDP, so that exports to Germany were less than 4 percent of Portuguese GDP.    
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country18. One the one hand, assume that center economy foreign assets in the periphery do 
not have much weight in center financial institutions’ balance sheets. In equation (1),  may 
thus be irrelevant to determine gC, so that GH0G0   G0G9M = 019. On the other hand, apply this line 
of reasoning also to equation (2) and to small periphery’ asset holdings in the center. 
Accordingly, we assume GH9G9  G9G0M = 0. 
Into this framework, now assume that a common negative economic shock occurs, curtailing 
growth and increasing public deficits in both economies. Economic downturn in the 
periphery, however, is deeper and lasts longer compared to recession in the center. Moreover, 
peripheral public finances register deeper imbalances than abroad and fiscal deficits 
skyrocket due to the implementation of cumbersome financial sector rescue packages and due 
to the effect of automatic stabilizers.  
In terms of a two-country version of figure 1, such events induce both loci *+ = 0 and *+ = 0 in the center and in the periphery to move downward. The extent of these 
movements, however, will be different. Deeper recession and wider public balance deficits call 
for stronger debt corrections in the periphery than in the center. Accordingly, the locus for 
stable dP values will move far more down than the corresponding locus for a constant debt-to-
GDP ratio in the center will do. Figure 2 below graphically reproduces this point. The upper 
part of figure 2 (henceforth figure 2.a) focuses on the periphery, while the bottom part of 
figure 2 (henceforth figure 2.b) plots changing dynamics in the center.   
Beyond these movements or perhaps stimulated by these same events, capital markets will 
not react neutrally to economic recessions and increasing debts in the periphery and in the 
center. Actually, apparently worsen conditions in the periphery will suddenly induce capitals 
to leave the country and give rise to a “run to quality”. The center, maybe thanks to its better 
capability to restore growth soon, will provide the right assets on which safely put money. 
                                                        
18 This assumption suits pretty well the case of financial relationships between central Euro countries and small 
peripheral economies such as Greece and Portugal. However, it might be partially amended in the case of Ireland, 
whose financial institutions present much stricter financial relationships with central economies.  
19 Through this assumption, we do not intend to neglect possible negative effects of, say, debt default in Greece, 
Portugal or Ireland on financial institutions in central Euro countries. Yet, in this model we adopt a comparative 
perspective and put emphasis on the fact that things would radically change in case financial turbulences will 
continue and possibly lead to default also big peripheral countries. In this regard, take into account that, by 
September 2011, according to data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), more than 80 percent of 
French banks’ foreign assets in peripheral Euro countries were concentrated in Italy and Spain. In the case of 
German banks, their exposure towards Italy and Spain amounted to 67 percent of overall German security 
holdings in peripheral Euro Member States. In light of this evidence, the above assumptions must be seen as a 
way to remark differences between a soft crisis scenario, in which small peripheral countries only risk default, 
and a much more worrisome crisis in which financial turbulences dramatically increase also in big peripheral 
economies.    
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According to the analysis above, factor εP will assume a positive value and lead financial 
operators to revise country-specific risks. In the periphery, an upward revision of factor σP 
will take place. Central economy bonds, on the contrary, will get higher ratings and the 
connected country-risk factor σC  will decrease. Graphically speaking, such a diverging 
reaction of financial markets in the center and the periphery are portrayed through opposite 
movements in the loci for + = 0 and + = 0. In figure 2.a, the locus for constant values of 
σP will move to the left. In figure 2.b, the locus for + = 0 will shift to the right. 
The final outcomes of these movements depend on their relative intensity. In figure 2 we 
provide a pretty extreme result, which nevertheless seems to well reflect the existing opposite 
dynamics between central and peripheral economies. In figure 2.a, higher public deficits, 
economic recession and financial markets’ fear about debt default all induce substantial 
increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio dP and in the risk indicator σP in the periphery. As a 
consequence of the initial temporary economic shock, the periphery seriously risks to 
permanently move from equilibrium A to a new equilibrium C, in which much higher interest 
rates will go hand-in-hand with far lower growth rates compared to the before-crisis period. 
Even worst, should the periphery be initially located in the unstable equilibrium B, perhaps 
the case of Greece, the above events could easily set in motion destabilizing dynamics and 
eventually lead the country to bankruptcy. Note that this could also happen in apparently 
much safer countries such as Spain and Ireland in case financial markets’ reactions to the 
crisis would be so strong to lead the two loci for + = 0 and *+ = 0 not to intersect any 
longer. 
In the center, a radically different picture emerges. The crisis-driven downward movement in 
the locus for *+ = 0 can obviously induce an increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, 
financial markets reactions to crisis in the periphery, capital flights to the center and the 
ensuing rightward shift in the locus for + = 0 may tame such trend. Actually, a slightly 
increasing debt-to-GDP ratio may paradoxically combine with a lower country risk factor, 
easing conditions on credit markets and rebounding growth (see equation (1)). Should the 
reactions of financial markets be sufficiently strong, debt-to-GDP ratio may even decrease 
along with a country risk factor close to zero. This is the picture we portray in figure 2.b, 
which in turn seems to resemble pretty well what is going on in a large central Euro country 
such as Germany. According to data from the IMF (2012), thanks to never-before-seen low 
interest rates and considerable economic recovery in 2010 and 2011, German debt-to-GDP 
ratio has started to decrease since 2010 and it is expected to further do so in 2012. 
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Figure 2.a – Debt-to-GDP ratio and country risk factor dynamics in the periphery in the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008  financial meltdown. 
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Figure 2.b – Debt-to-GDP ratio and country risk factor dynamics in the center in the aftermath 
of the 2007-2008  financial meltdown.
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3.2 The big center-big periphery case. 
The diverging outcomes of the 2007-2008 financial crash in the center and in the periphery of 
the Eurozone heavily depend on the assumption of weak center-periphery economic and 
financial relationships. This assumption sounds reasonable insofar as we deal with a small 
peripheral country. Things radically change and get much more complex in case of a big 
peripheral economy. There are at least two additional elements to consider which contribute 
to explain center-periphery joined dynamics in case of big economies.  
First, trade relationships between a big center and a big periphery are likely stronger than in 
the case of a small periphery. Economic recession in Italy, for instance, will likely have 
negative effects on economic dynamics in Germany via the export channel. In terms of our 
model, this implies that  GH0G!"0 G!"0G!"0→V9 > 0 20. Note that a sort of perverse multiplicative 
feedback mechanism may emerge, according to which recession in a big peripheral country 
may curtail growth in the center, which, in turn, will deepen economic contraction in the 
periphery. More in general, besides such direct effects, crisis in big peripheral countries may 
produce a wide systemic contraction of trade relationships and economic dynamics. Italy is 
the second most important trade partner of France, which in turn stands up as the largest 
market for German exports. We cannot neglect the possibility that a severe economic 
downturn in Italy will hinder economic activity in France and therefore Germany.  
Second, but perhaps more relevantly, central economy asset holdings in big peripheral 
countries are much more substantial than those in small economies (see footnote 15). It is 
thus pretty hard to believe that, even in presence of capital flights to the center, center’s 
financial system will be immune to a mounting crisis in the periphery. Actually, the negative 
relationship between sovereign debt crisis in the periphery, falling prices of periphery bonds 
and worsening conditions on central economy credit markets may well be at work. On the one 
hand, investment in the center may be jeopardized by more stringent conditionalities set by a 
troubled banking system, so that GH0G0   G0G9M > 0. On the other hand, note that the highly 
intertwined financial structure between central Euro countries and big peripheral economies 
would easily give rise to a perverse cycle between bankruptcies in the periphery and financial 
dislocation in the center. Accordingly, also central economy bonds may start to be under 
pressure should international investors fear about a chaotic Euro system collapse.  
                                                        
20 EC→BP stands for center economy exports towards the big peripheral economy. Analogously, EBP→C represents 
big peripheral economy’s exports to the center.  
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In light of all these new facts that might arise in case of a deepening financial crisis in a big 
periphery, it is much more complex than before to see diverging trends between central and 
peripheral economies. Positive factors which may somehow induce central economies to get 
benefitted from crisis in the periphery still exist. However, they are now counterbalanced by 
the cumbersome negative effects above. To try to see this more formally, take into account the 
full-extended dynamic system composed by equations (7)-(10). Moreover, try to assess its 
stability properties through the four-by-four Jacobian matrix JC/BP.     
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The long list of equations below explicitly states the partial derivatives (evaluated at the 
steady state) contained in matrix  JC/BP and the corresponding signs: 
 
G10+G10 = * YZΩ0Z[010Ω010\ − 1 + % GH0G10] with G10+G10 < 0 when dC → 0 and G10+G10 > 0 when dC → ∝. 
  ?*+? = −*1 + % ?? > 0 
 ?*+?* = −*1 + % ??	 ?	?	→X ?	→X? ??* ≥ 0 
 ?*+? = −*1 + % ?? ?? ?? > 0 
 ?+?* = 3 > 0 ?+? = −3 ?*444?*∗ ?*∗? < 0 
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?+?* = 0 
 ?+? = 0 
 ?*+?* = −*1 + ( ??	 ?	?	X→ ?	X→? ??* ≥ 0 
 ?*+? = −*1 + ( ?? ?? ?? ≥ 0 
 
G19+G19 = * YZΩ9Z[919Ω919\ − 1 + ( GH9G19] with G19+G19 < 0 when dP → 0 and G19+G19 > 0 when dP → ∝. 
 ?+?* = 0 
 ?+? = 0 
 ?+?* = : > 0 
 ?+? = −: ?*444?*∗ ?*∗? < 0 
 
According to partial derivatives’ signs, we deal with a Metzlerian matrix with all extra-
diagonal elements positive or null but not negative. Following Gandolfo (1996), a necessary 
and sufficient condition for stability thus requires upper-left minor principals of matrix JC/BP 
to alternate in sign starting with a minus sign associated to ?*+ /?*. Depending on the 
various signs that part of the above derivatives may assume, several stability scenarios exist. 
It is however pretty easy to see that the stability condition just reported will be immediately 
violated in case of a pretty high debt-to-GDP ratio in the center such that ?*+ /?* > 0 (i.e. 
equilibrium in the center on the downward sloping section of the locus for  *+ = 0). Let 
 23
thus consider the simplest and, say, safest scenario possible in which both the center and the 
big peripheral country present pretty low values of their own debt-to-GDP ratios, so that: ?*+ /?* < 0; ?*+ /?* < 0; ?*+ /?* = 0 and ?*+ /?* = 0. In this context, it is 
immediate to verify that: 
  _;/X _ = _?*+ /?*_ < 0 
 _;/XD _ = |;| > 0  
 _;/Xa _ = ?*+ /?*|;| < 0 
 
Once satisfied the above three sub-conditions, local stability also requires _;/X_ > 0. After a 
quite considerable amount of algebra, it is possible to show that: 
 
_;/X_ = ?*+?* ?+? bb
?*+?* ?*+??+?* ?+?b
b − ?+?* cde
df?*+? bb
?*+?* ?*+??+?* ?+?b
b − ?*+? g− ?+?* ?*+?hidj
dk
 
 
That is: 
 
_;/X_ = |;||;| − 3: G19+GI0 G10+GI9 ≷ 0                                                                                                        (11) 
 
From expression (11) for the determinant of the matrix JC/BP, the sign of _;/X_ can be either 
positive or negative. In the first case, the four-by-four dynamic system is locally stable. 
Otherwise, instability arises. Into a big center-big periphery context, therefore, stability 
cannot be assure even in the safest scenario possible assuming low initial values of debt-to-
GDP ratios in both economies. Note that in such a context both systems would be stable if 
considered individually. Instability, however, may emerge due to the financial links 
connecting them (see the cross-country factors ?*+ /? and ?*+ /? in equation (11)). 
The more financially integrated countries are and the more exposed single-country credit 
institutions are to financial turbulences in the partner country, the higher the likelihood that 
financial instability in a big peripheral economy will extend to the center and give rise to 
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generalized Eurozone instability. Of course, instability would get even worst should the 
periphery be in a much more precarious position characterized by an initial pretty high debt-
to-GDP ratio. In such a case, also a temporary and small shock may generate explosive 
dynamics with negative effects on both peripheral and central economic activity.  
In order to figure out the point in a perhaps clearer way, try to modify figure 2 according to 
the new assumptions introduced. We do this in figure 3. In figure 3, the onset of the crisis 
follows the same lines seen in case of a small peripheral country. However, possible initial 
diverging trends between the center and the big periphery may now be replaced by cross-
country similar dynamics when degrading financial conditions in the periphery will impinge 
financial institutions’ solidity in the center, this way curtailing growth and raising the center 
economy debt-to-GDP ratio. In figures 3.a and 3.b, this event is represented by a sequence of 
downward movements in the two loci for *+ = 0 and *+ = 0, which will now feed back 
each other and spread financial and economic crisis in the overall Eurozone. It is now pretty 
easy to see that in case such a perverse cycle would effectively take place, no center-periphery 
diverging trends will exist any longer. Quite the opposite, without some Member States’ 
common effort to stop the crisis, the breakdown of the overall Eurozone will appear as more 
than a concrete possibility.    
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Figure 3.a – Peripheral economy financial instability in the center-big periphery case 
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Figure 3.b – Central economy financial instability in the center-big periphery case. 
 
4. The Myopic Logic of Fiscal Austerity and the Need of a Monetary Sovereign European 
Federal Government 
 
The main challenge peripheral Euro countries are currently facing is a sovereign debt crisis. It 
consists in the incapability of peripheral Euro Member States to easily access financial 
markets and refinance outstanding debts (Kregel, 2012). This said, are such difficulties due to 
previous irresponsible fiscal policies? In the case of Greece, fiscal indiscipline is a long-lasting 
problem dating far back to Greek entry in the monetary union. In the case of Spain and 
Ireland, however, the answer is surely on the negative. Generalized fiscal profligacy cannot be 
identified as the in-deep source of existing problems in the Eurozone (De Grauwe, 2010).  
Actually, the current Eurozone crisis seems to have been favored by the very original 
Eurozone institutional setup. The nowadays European Monetary Union (EMU) is a sort of 
confederation of independent States (Young and Semmler, 2011). First, Eurozone countries 
are in the same position of US States but without any federal institution helping them in case 
of severe economic downturns. Second, Euro countries are users of a common currency, but 
they do not issue them, so that they do not have monetary sovereignty any longer. The 
nowadays EMU thus works “much like a US with a FED, but with only individual state 
treasuries. It will be as if each EMU Member country were to attempt to operate fiscal policy 
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in a foreign currency; deficit spending will require borrowing in that foreign currency 
according to the dictates of private markets (Wray, 1998, pp. 91-92)”.  
Such an institutional framework may obviously work well in time of financial stability. 
However, due to the global economic recession triggered off by the 2007-2008 subprime 
crisis, Euro countries’ deficits have soared as long as risk premia on their debts, this way 
giving rise to a perverse and possibly unstable cycle between fiscal imbalances and financial 
turbulences. As Papadimitriou and Wray (2012) clearly put it, “with no “Uncle Sam” to come 
to their rescue” peripheral Euro Member States now need help from the European Central 
Bank, but this option is explicitly forbidden by the monetarist-type statements included in 
Treaty on the Functioning of the Monetary Union. The peripheral Euro countries’ sovereign 
debt crisis immediately follows from such a state of things as much as center-periphery 
capital flights and diverging trends do.  
In the final part of the previous section we have shown that such diverging trends and 
conflicting interests may disappear in case default risks will deepen in big peripheral 
economies and spread also in central Member States. It is now straightforward to wonder 
whether the fear of a Euro system breakdown may lead Member countries to avoid Euro-
skeptic positions and to undertake a common response to the crisis. If so, it also makes sense 
to wonder which kind of common solution could be adopted. Do Member countries have to 
continue on the way of fiscal austerity followed so far and rigorously adhere to the so-called 
Fiscal Compact? Alternatively, do we have to hope in a reform of the Euro system towards the 
creation of a fully sovereign federal European Union admitting more space for a federal 
expansionary fiscal policy? 
As to the first point, when severe economic crises hurt, nationalistic and populist feelings 
could easily emerge and eventually sign the end of Euro Project. Indeed, worsening economic 
conditions in big peripheral economies and heavier repercussions in the center do not 
guarantee that converging interests among Euro countries would be recognized by national 
governments and that a strengthened European cooperation would take place.  
As to the second point, the so-called Fiscal Compact does not add much to the already 
operative Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) nor it excludes, a priori, expansionary fiscal stances 
to be adopted in case of extraordinary events. Nevertheless, it remarks even more strongly 
than before the balanced budget principle as the general rule Euro Member States have to 
follow. First, such rule must be enforced through Member States’ laws, better if constitutional 
laws. Second, fiscal deficits must be temporary and short-lived. Euro Member States are 
demanded to put in place automatic mechanisms to rapidly downsize fiscal deficit deviations 
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from their Medium-Term Targets, even in case of temporary deviations justified by 
extraordinary circumstances. The general philosophy of the fiscal compact is such that fiscal 
policy should be hardly available as stabilization tool and that Euro Member countries should 
be prohibited to run considerable fiscal deficits in the same ways sovereign States like US, UK 
and Japan have done since 2007.   
According to our analysis, such kind of tighter Euro countries coordination does not address 
the core point of Eurozone difficulties. Indeed, all the perverse center-(big) periphery 
mechanisms that can deepen economic recession and spread it in the overall Eurozone are 
still at work even in presence of the Fiscal Compact. To see this, take figures 3.a and 3.b and 
assume that, according to the disposal of the Fiscal Compact, the two loci for + = 0 and + = 0 are pretty steep and lie very close to the origin of the axes21. Assume also that both 
the center and the periphery have initial debt-to-GDP ratios in line with the corresponding 
long-run values *m∗  and *∗  implied by the Fiscal Compact. For the sake of simplicity, assume *  
and *  to be originally equal to zero and the starting long-run equilibrium A to be located in 
the origin of the axes. We portray these scenarios in figures 4.a and 4.b below. Figure 4.a 
refers to a big peripheral Euro country. Figure 4.b represents the center.  
 
 
A 
σP 
dP dPA 
σPC 
dPC 
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Figure 4.a – Global economic crisis in a big peripheral Euro country in presence of the Fiscal 
Compact 
                                                        
21 Remember that the Fiscal Compact imposes Euro Member countries to have a structural public balance deficit 
no higher than 0.5 percent of GDP (1 percent in case of Euro countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio lower than 60 
percent). In terms of our model, this would imply Ω∗ ≈ *∗ ≈ 0.  
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Figure 4.b – Global economic crisis in the center in presence of the Fiscal Compact             
 
Now imagine that a global recession like the 2007-2008 crisis hurts, so that growth rates 
plunge and effective fiscal deficits, even though temporarily, widen. Accordingly, the two loci 
for *+ = 0 and *+ = 0 move downwards. Again, despite of capital flights from the 
periphery to the center22, Euro countries’ risk factors may increase in both economies and 
trigger off the downward spiral already seen in figures 3.a and 3.b. Further, the automatic 
fiscal correction mechanisms envisaged by the Fiscal Compact may not help to improve the 
picture and stabilize (or reduce) debt-to-GDP ratios in Euro Member countries. First, 
restrictive national fiscal stances may exacerbate economic recessions in their own countries 
and paradoxically hinder fiscal consolidation itself. Second, and perhaps worst, a fallacy of 
composition problem may arise. Actually, in presence of a systemic recession, all Euro 
Member countries will have to simultaneously implement fiscal corrections regardless of the 
effective solidity of their public balances. Fiscal austerity in the big periphery will thus 
jeopardize growth and economic recovery in the center, which, in turn, due to its own fiscal 
stabilization package, will reduce economic activity in the periphery even further. Eventually, 
                                                        
22 As usual, we model financial markets’ asymmetric reactions to the crisis and capital flight to the center 
through a rightward movement in the locus for + = 0 in figure 4.b. Differently from figure 3.a, however, we 
assume the locus for + = 0 not to move further to the left in figure 4.a. Actually, we capture the economic 
implications of the Fiscal Compact balanced budget rule by permanently placing the locus for + = 0 in the 
farthest left position possible.   
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the obsession for a generalized fiscal austerity may result in a Eurozone center-periphery 
lose-lose game. 
Reforms in the European governance and in the coordination of Member States economic 
policies should aim at strengthening Euro countries’ fiscal solidity and, at the same time, 
providing enough room for expansionary counter-cyclical policies. Austerity packages alone 
do not help growth and, this way, eventually risk to endanger public balance stability as well. 
Fiscal consolidation and the balanced budget rule foreseen by the Fiscal Compact may instead 
be useful in case they should be part of a much wider reform agenda. The final achievement of 
such agenda should be the creation of a full-fledged European Federal Union. According to the 
analysis above, such political entity and the way to realize it such rely on two main features. 
1. Due to financial market distress, Euro Member States and in particular peripheral countries 
are de facto impeded to run expansionary fiscal policies. Fiscal policies should therefore be 
implemented by European authorities. In institutional terms, this amounts to say that the 
current confederation of independent states should be progressively transformed in a 
federal union with a federal government charged to run fiscal policies eventually financed 
by issuing European Treasure Bills. More in detail, a fully developed European federal 
government should first have the right to levy federal taxes on European citizens and 
economic actors and to dispose of a federal budget. Second, the European government 
should take care of providing some social services connected, for instance, to the pension 
system and unemployment safety net. Last but not least, the future federal European 
government should implement an European industrial policy whose aim, among several, is 
to progressively eliminate structural differences among Euro countries and to level off 
regional inequalities. Actually, diverging trends among central and peripheral Euro 
countries also depend on their asymmetric productive structures. The ensuing Eurozone 
imbalances and Member countries different capabilities to deal with economic recessions 
can be hardly eliminated through painful macroeconomic adjustments and internal 
devaluations aiming to improve cost competitiveness only. Long-term industrial and 
development policies can do this. The process of market integration and the European 
competition policy, however, limit the possibility of national governments to run industrial 
and regional policies by their own. These kind of policies must thus be implemented at 
European level.  
    We are perfectly aware that the creation of a federal government of the Eurozone is a far-
reaching objective. One the one hand, the implementation of some policies above will 
previously require a long process of harmonization among Euro countries in terms of the 
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standards of the social services now provided by each country individually and 
subsequently centralized at European level. On the other hand, both short-run anti-cyclical 
policies and long-run development policies will imply some sort of fiscal transfer from 
developed countries to relatively underdeveloped economies. Nevertheless, this is the only 
reliable solution to solve the present problems and, hopefully, avoid future sovereign debt 
crises due to national governments burdened by the full cost of deep recessions and 
financial sector rescue packages. Further, it appears to us as the only way to permanently 
eradicate structural differences among central and peripheral economies and to create a 
much more solid basis for the European economic and political integration. 
2. The future European federal Union must have full monetary sovereignty. In this sense, the 
strictly monetarist philosophy inspiring the ECB statute should be deeply modified. 
Actually, the ECB should be transformed in the central bank of the European federal union 
and should be empowered of a lender-of-last-resort function. According to the MMT, this 
passage is fundamental to stop financial speculation and avoid any possible fear about 
European federal government financial soundness. Moreover, such a change does not threat 
in any way central bank independence from the political sphere. Actually, it is useful to keep 
clear in mind the very difference between an independent central bank and a detached 
central bank (Palley, 2011). In the first case, the central bank is absolutely free from 
external influences in its decision making and can freely decide to buy or not to buy 
government Treasury Bills according to the objectives of the monetary policy. In the second 
case, on the contrary, the central bank is explicitly prohibited to buy government bonds or 
any other public institution liability. Whilst this last case corresponds to the nowadays ECB, 
the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England are examples of independent-but-not-
detached central banks. Future developments of the ECB should move it towards such an 
Anglo-Saxon model in order to provide the European federal Union with the complete 
prerogatives and financial credibility of sovereign states. 
Which would be the consequences of these institutional changes on the center-periphery 
dynamics described in our model? We want to stress two possible aspects. First, thanks to the 
existence of a European federal government, the costs of anti-cyclical discretionary measures 
will largely move from national public balances to the European federal budget. Accordingly, 
whilst Member States may safely pursue some balanced budget rule without hampering 
economic activity, growth can be supported and brought back pretty soon by the counter-
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cyclical policies adopted by the federal government23. In terms of the graphical 
representations above, both the loci for stable debt-to-GDP ratios in the center and in the 
periphery will barely move downward or they will broadly remain in the same original 
positions. Second, and perhaps more relevantly, financial markets will not react nervously to 
the outbreak of the crisis and they will not give rise to center-periphery capital flights. 
Actually, fiscal stimuli to economic activity and financial system’s rescue programs will not 
burden national government balances, so that no fear of national government insolvency will 
upset financial markets. Accordingly, speculative forces will not get strength; liquidity will not 
suddenly dry in the peripheral part of the system and move to the center. In terms of the 
graphs above, no asymmetric movements in the two loci for stable values of σC and σP will 
take place in the center and in the periphery and Euro Members’ country-risk factors will not 
be revised upward. In this much safer context, it is easy to see that all the feedback 
mechanisms giving rise to a race to hell and to a perverse spiral between increasing debt 
service costs, fiscal correction and deepening crisis will likely be broken.   
Of course, pretty relevant fiscal deficits may now emerge at federal level, with the federal 
European government financing expenditures by issuing new Euro bonds. Euro bonds, 
however, will be hardly subjected to speculative attacks. On the one hand, financial markets 
will perfectly know that the European government has full monetary sovereignty and that the 
ECB will back it in case financial turbulences should emerge. On the other hand, Euro bonds 
may appear as safe assets and temporary represent the best options for portfolio investment 
insofar as recession is over, economic activity recover and private assets return in the 
preferences of financial operators. Indeed, this seems to be what is going on in sovereign 
States such as US, UK or Japan, where Treasury Bills’ interest rates are at never-before-seen 
low levels despite of remarkable fiscal deficits, actually much higher than those recorded on 
average in the Eurozone, and fast increasing debt-to-GDP ratios (De Grauwe, 2011; 2012).  
 
5. Conclusions     
 
Eurozone Member countries, peripheral economies in particular, have been dealing with a 
severe sovereign debt crisis since mid 2010. With the exception of Greece, this crisis does not 
depend on previous irresponsible fiscal policies. Indeed, its origin dates back to the 2007-
                                                        
23 Such an institutional arrangement may turn out to be pretty similar to the US institutional setting. In the US, in 
presence of a federal government budget whose total non-interest spending in 2006 (i.e. before the outbreak of 
the 2007-2008 crisis) were around 18 percent of US potential GDP, most US States follow some sort of balanced 
budget rules. See Auerbach (2008) and National Conference of State Legislature (2010) on this point.  
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2008 global financial and economic meltdown. The existing Eurozone institutional 
framework, however, has decisively contributed to generate, amplify and protract it. First, the 
lack of a federal European government running anti-cyclical policies has left alone national 
governments in their efforts to counteract recessions and avoid financial institutions’ 
collapse. National governments’ deficits and debt stocks have thus massively increased 
alongside default risks. Second, the loss of monetary sovereignty and the absence of a lender-
of-last-resort central bank has further increased the risk Euro countries will not be able to 
meet debt payments. Such Eurozone peculiarities may well explain why financial turbulences 
paradoxically concentrate in Europe even though, on average, Eurozone’s deficit and debt 
records are much lower than those observed in fully sovereign countries such US, UK and 
Japan. 
In this paper, we show that, in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis, the incomplete nature of 
the Euro system (as compared to a fully developed federal union) has created the proper 
environment for speculative center-periphery capital flights to take place. These movements 
have in turn given rise to diverging trends between central and peripheral Member States. On 
the one hand, the former now benefit of never-before-seen low interest rates which 
considerably ease fiscal consolidation and economic recovery. On the other hand, the latter 
are stuck in a never-ending adjustment process that financial market turbulences and 
mounting debt service costs persistently frustrate. In our view, such divergences and the 
ensuing conflicting claims between central and peripheral Euro countries can seriously feed 
peripheral country’ crisis by hampering any attempt to reform Eurozone towards the creation 
of a complete federal entity. In the long run, however, they may prove to be self-defeating. 
Overall instability may indeed spread around Europe and center-periphery dichotomy not 
last any longer should financial turmoil deepen also in large peripheral economies. 
The strategy adopted so far to end the crisis has been generalized austerity. The results, 
however, have been disappointing since that the crisis is still on and may even worsen. 
Actually, austerity-based reforms in European governance do not address the above 
deficiencies of Eurozone institutions. They could instead make sense into a more general 
reform agenda, whose final purpose is the introduction of a federal European government 
together with a government banker.  
In our view, a full-fledged European federal union with a lender-of-last-resort central bank 
designs the final status current Eurozone institutions should aspire to. Yet, we are well aware 
that this reform will be ferociously disputed, it will take time to be implemented and cannot 
realistically provide immediate relief from existing difficulties. Accordingly, which are some 
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initial and perhaps narrower steps to be taken in the short run to stop the crisis? In the most 
recent period, economic chronicles have put emphasis on new monetary measures 
established by the ECB. In particular, attention is on the ECB Board announcement of an 
unlimited Euro country bond-buying program aiming to strike speculation, reduce interest 
rates and debt service costs, favor fiscal consolidation in peripheral economies. We all know 
that these measures are the result of intensive political bargaining among Euro countries’ 
Heads, the ECB and the European institutions. Further, they do not get the support of all the 
authorities involved in the decision process (see the opposition of the Deutsche Bundesbank) 
and their adoption is conditional to the launch of austerity programs and structural reforms 
in the helped countries. Despite all these limits, there is however no doubt the ECB unlimited 
bond-buying program stands out as the most reasonable initiative policy makers could now 
take to tame the crisis and, perhaps, see the light at the end of the tunnel. It probably 
represents the first measure emendating the strict monetarist paradigm inspiring the ECB 
statute and its behavior so far as well as, hopefully, the first step on the way towards the 
creation of a lender-of-last-resort central bank. This monetary measure is not enough. 
Actually, sustained growth and full recovery from the recession will hardly take place without 
considerable expansionary fiscal stances. Nevertheless, it will be much easier to find room for 
expansionary stances, at national level for the time being and at European level in the future, 
in presence of an interventionist monetary policy which contrasts financial speculation and 
ensures financial markets that the “Euro is irreversible (Mario Draghi, ECB Press Conference, 
September 6th 2012)”. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 – Some central and peripheral Euro countries’ Macroeconomic data. 
Country\Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Austia GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 2,0 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,6 1,7 1,8 1,7 1,5 1,5   
Sectoral Industry 30,8 30,3 29,5 29,5 29,4 29,5 29,7 30,1 30,2 29,2 29,2   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 23,3 23,2 22,6 22,2 22,2 22,4 22,8 23,2 23,2 21,8 22,3   
Composition Manufacturing 20,6 20,3 19,8 19,4 19,3 19,6 20,0 20,4 20,4 18,6 19,2   
  Construction 7,5 7,1 7,0 7,3 7,2 7,1 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,3 6,9   
  Services 67,2 67,7 68,5 68,6 68,7 68,9 68,6 68,1 68,0 69,3 69,3   
  Exports of goods and services 46,2 48,1 48,7 48,2 51,5 53,8 56,4 58,9 59,3 50,4 54,0   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 44,5 45,9 43,9 44,7 47,7 49,9 51,3 53,2 53,5 45,7 49,7   
financial external Trade Balance 1,7 2,2 4,8 3,5 3,8 4,0 5,1 5,7 5,8 4,8 4,3   
position Overall Current Account Balance -0,7 -0,8 2,7 1,7 2,2 2,2 2,8 3,5 4,9 2,7 3,0   
  External Investment Net Position -24,5 -25,6 -20,1 -14,3 -17,3 -21,7 -20,5 -18,2 -16,9 -8,0 -10,9 -3,4 
General  Public Deficit -1,8 -0,2 -0,9 -1,7 -4,6 -1,8 -1,7 -1,0 -1,0 -4,1 -4,5 -2,6 
macroeconomic Public Debt 66,2 66,8 66,2 65,3 64,7 64,2 62,3 60,2 63,8 69,5 71,8 72,2 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 3,7 0,6 1,7 0,6 2,6 2,4 3,7 3,7 1,4 -3,8 2,3 3,1 
Belgium GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 1,38 1,32 1,18 1,12 1,11 0,83 0,90 0,88 0,67 0,67 0,70   
Sectoral Industry 27,0 26,1 25,5 24,8 24,6 24,1 24,0 23,8 23,2 21,7 21,9   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 22,1 21,2 20,7 19,9 19,7 19,2 19,0 18,5 17,7 16,3 16,6   
Composition Manufacturing 19,3 18,5 18,2 17,4 17,5 17,1 16,7 16,3 15,7 14,4 14,6   
  Construction 5,0 4,9 4,8 4,8 4,8 4,8 5,1 5,2 5,5 5,4 5,3   
  Services 71,6 72,6 73,3 74,1 74,3 75,1 75,0 75,4 76,1 77,6 77,4   
  Exports of goods and services 78,1 77,8 76,7 73,9 75,9 78,7 80,8 82,6 84,6 72,4 80,0   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 75,2 74,2 71,0 68,5 71,0 74,8 77,0 78,8 83,7 69,6 77,3   
financial external Trade Balance 2,9 3,6 5,7 5,4 4,9 3,9 3,8 3,8 0,9 2,7 2,7   
position Overall Current Account Balance 4,0 3,4 4,5 3,4 3,2 2,0 1,9 1,6 -1,6 -1,7 1,5   
  External Investment Net Position     36,6 36,6 28,4 33,5 29,4 28,9 39,7 57,1 77,7 57,8 
General  Public Deficit -0,1 0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,4 -2,8 0,1 -0,3 -1,3 -5,9 -4,2 -4,2 
macroeconomic Public Debt 107,8 106,5 103,4 98,4 94,0 92,0 88,0 84,1 89,3 95,9 96,2 98,5 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 3,7 0,6 1,4 0,6 3,3 1,7 2,7 2,9 0,7 -2,8 2,3 1,9 
Source: Data from UNCTAD, IMF, EUROSTAT. (continue) 
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Country\Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Finland GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 3,50 3,27 3,18 3,07 2,87 2,77 2,42 3,01 2,87 2,71 2,89   
Sectoral Industry 34,7 34,1 33,2 32,9 32,5 32,5 33,6 33,8 32,3 28,2 29,0   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 28,4 28,1 27,5 27,0 26,3 25,8 26,8 26,8 25,0 21,2 22,3   
Composition Manufacturing 26,5 26,0 25,2 24,4 23,7 23,4 24,1 24,2 22,4 18,2 18,8   
  Construction 6,2 6,0 5,7 5,9 6,2 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,2 7,0 6,6   
  Services 61,8 62,6 63,7 64,0 64,6 64,8 64,0 63,2 64,9 69,1 68,1   
  Exports of goods and services 43,6 41,5 40,6 38,7 39,9 41,8 45,5 45,8 46,8 37,1 40,3   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 34,5 32,2 31,3 31,9 33,4 37,7 40,8 40,7 43,1 35,5 39,0   
financial external Trade Balance 9,1 9,4 9,2 6,8 6,5 4,1 4,7 5,1 3,8 1,6 1,3   
position Overall Current Account Balance 7,8 8,4 8,5 4,8 6,2 3,4 4,2 4,3 2,6 1,8 1,4   
  External Investment Net Position -147,8 -82,2 -36,8 -26,4 -10,0 -15,3 -13,8 -27,9 -9,7 0,0 10,6 16,0 
General  Public Deficit 6,9 5,1 4,1 2,4 2,2 2,7 4,0 5,3 4,2 -2,7 -2,8 -0,8 
macroeconomic Public Debt 43,8 42,5 41,5 44,5 44,4 41,7 39,6 35,2 33,9 43,5 48,4 48,6 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 5,3 2,3 1,8 2,0 4,1 2,9 4,4 5,3 0,2 -8,4 3,7 2,9 
France GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 2,83 2,84 2,70 2,47 2,44 2,28 2,09 2,20 2,04 1,74 1,99   
Sectoral Industry 22,9 22,4 21,8 21,2 20,9 20,7 20,4 20,5 20,2 18,8 19,8   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 17,7 17,1 16,5 15,9 15,4 15,0 14,4 14,2 13,6 12,4 13,4   
Composition Manufacturing 16,0 15,4 14,7 14,1 13,6 13,2 12,6 12,4 11,9 10,6 11,6   
  Construction 5,1 5,3 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,6 6,0 6,3 6,6 6,4 6,4   
  Services 74,3 74,8 75,5 76,3 76,7 77,1 77,5 77,3 77,7 79,5 78,2   
  Exports of goods and services 28,8 28,4 27,5 25,9 26,1 26,4 27,0 26,9 26,9 23,3 25,5   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 27,8 27,2 26,0 25,0 25,7 27,0 28,1 28,4 29,1 25,2 27,8   
financial external Trade Balance 1,0 1,1 1,5 0,9 0,4 -0,6 -1,0 -1,5 -2,1 -1,8 -2,3   
position Overall Current Account Balance 1,5 1,8 1,2 0,5 0,4 -0,5 -0,6 -1,0 -1,7 -1,5 -1,7   
  External Investment Net Position -7,6 -2,0 3,0 -4,2 -4,7 1,1 1,1 -1,5 -12,9 -9,4 -7,8 -15,9 
General  Public Deficit -1,5 -1,7 -3,3 -4,1 -3,6 -3,0 -2,4 -2,8 -3,3 -7,6 -7,1 -5,3 
macroeconomic Public Debt 57,3 56,9 59,0 63,2 65,1 66,7 63,9 64,2 68,3 79,0 82,4 86,3 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 3,9 1,8 0,7 0,6 2,3 1,9 2,7 2,2 -0,2 -2,6 1,4 1,7 
(continue) 
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Country\Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Germany GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 1,26 1,36 1,15 0,98 1,10 0,87 0,85 0,96 0,90 0,81 0,87   
Sectoral Industry 30,3 29,7 29,1 28,9 29,3 29,1 29,9 30,4 29,6 26,5 27,9   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 25,1 24,9 24,6 24,5 25,1 25,2 25,9 26,4 25,6 22,2 23,7   
Composition Manufacturing 22,9 22,8 22,4 22,4 22,6 22,7 23,3 23,8 22,7 19,1 20,7   
  Construction 5,2 4,8 4,6 4,4 4,2 4,0 3,9 4,0 4,0 4,3 4,1   
  Services 68,5 69,0 69,7 70,2 69,6 70,0 69,3 68,6 69,5 72,7 71,3   
  Exports of goods and services 33,4 34,8 35,7 35,7 38,5 41,3 45,5 47,2 48,1 41,9 46,8   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 33,1 32,8 31,2 31,8 33,5 36,1 39,9 40,2 41,8 37,0 41,4   
financial external Trade Balance 0,3 2,0 4,5 3,9 5,0 5,2 5,6 7,0 6,2 5,0 5,5   
position Overall Current Account Balance -1,7 0,0 2,0 1,9 4,7 5,1 6,3 7,5 6,2 5,9 6,1   
  External Investment Net Position 3,3 8,7 5,1 6,6 10,7 21,0 27,9 26,5 25,0 35,1 38,4 36,1 
General  Public Deficit 1,3 -2,8 -3,7 -4,1 -3,8 -3,4 -1,6 0,2 -0,1 -3,2 -4,3 -1,0 
macroeconomic Public Debt 60,2 59,1 60,7 64,4 66,2 68,5 67,9 65,2 66,7 74,4 83,2 81,5 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 3,3 1,6 0,0 -0,4 0,5 0,6 3,9 3,4 0,6 -5,1 3,6 3,1 
Greece GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 6,6 6,4 5,9 5,5 4,9 4,8 3,7 3,4 3,1 3,1 3,3   
Sectoral Industry 21,0 21,4 19,5 19,0 18,7 19,2 19,4 18,8 18,1 17,8 17,9   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 13,9 13,2 13,3 12,5 12,3 12,9 12,5 12,3 13,1 13,3 13,8   
Composition Manufacturing 11,1 10,5 10,2 9,6 9,3 9,7 9,6 9,2 10,0 10,3 10,8   
  Construction 7,0 8,2 6,2 6,5 6,5 6,3 6,9 6,5 5,1 4,5 4,1   
  Services 72,5 72,2 74,6 75,5 76,4 76,0 76,9 77,8 78,7 79,1 78,8   
  Exports of goods and services 24,9 24,0 21,1 20,0 22,4 23,2 22,9 23,5 24,1 19,2 21,5   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 38,4 37,2 34,6 32,3 32,4 32,5 33,7 37,0 38,6 30,5 30,4   
financial external Trade Balance -13,5 -13,2 -13,5 -12,3 -10,1 -9,3 -10,8 -13,5 -14,4 -11,4 -8,9   
position Overall Current Account Balance -7,7 -7,2 -6,5 -6,6 -5,9 -7,4 -11,2 -14,4 -14,7 -11,0 -10,0   
  External Investment Net Position -40,1 -46,5 -52,9 -58,9 -67,0 -77,3 -85,3 -96,3 -76,9 -86,1 -92,5 -79,5 
General  Public Deficit -3,7 -4,4 -4,8 -5,7 -7,4 -5,6 -6,0 -6,7 -9,7 -15,6 -10,6 -9,2 
macroeconomic Public Debt 103,4 103,7 101,5 97,3 98,8 100,3 106,1 105,4 110,7 127,1 142,8 163,3 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 4,5 4,2 3,4 5,9 4,4 2,3 4,6 3,0 -0,1 -3,3 -3,5 -6,9 
(continue) 
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Country\Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Ireland GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 3,7 3,4 2,9 2,7 2,6 2,7 2,4 2,4 2,3 2,1 2,5   
Sectoral Industry 41,0 40,5 41,3 37,9 35,9 34,2 33,7 32,7 30,4 29,4 30,9   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 33,7 33,0 33,8 30,0 27,2 24,4 23,3 23,4 23,2 25,1 27,8   
Composition Manufacturing 32,2 31,3 32,3 28,3 25,7 22,9 21,6 21,5 21,2 23,1 25,5   
  Construction 7,3 7,5 7,5 7,9 8,8 9,7 10,4 9,3 7,2 4,3 3,1   
  Services 55,3 56,1 55,8 59,4 61,4 63,1 63,9 64,9 67,3 68,5 66,6   
  Exports of goods and services 97,3 99,1 93,4 83,1 83,2 81,1 78,9 80,2 83,4 90,9 101,1   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 84,0 83,7 76,3 67,2 68,3 69,4 69,3 71,3 74,4 75,4 82,0   
financial external Trade Balance 13,3 15,4 17,1 15,9 14,8 11,7 9,6 9,0 9,1 15,5 19,1   
position Overall Current Account Balance -0,4 -0,6 -1,0 0,0 -0,6 -3,5 -3,5 -5,3 -5,7 -2,9 0,3   
  External Investment Net Position -7,9 -15,1 -17,8 -20,0 -17,9 -24,5 -5,3 -19,4 -75,7 -103,1 -90,5 -97,6 
General  Public Deficit 4,7 0,6 -0,5 0,2 1,3 1,7 2,9 0,1 -7,3 -14,2 -31,3 -9,9 
macroeconomic Public Debt 37,5 35,2 31,9 30,7 29,1 27,1 24,7 24,8 44,2 65,2 92,5 105,0 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 9,3 4,8 5,9 4,2 4,5 5,3 5,3 5,2 -3,0 -7,0 -0,4 0,5 
Italy GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 2,8 2,7 2,6 2,5 2,5 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,9   
Sectoral Industry 28,4 28,1 27,8 27,1 27,0 26,9 27,2 27,5 27,0 25,2 25,3   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 23,4 22,8 22,4 21,4 21,2 20,9 21,1 21,4 20,9 19,0 19,4   
Composition Manufacturing 21,0 20,4 19,9 19,0 18,8 18,5 18,7 19,0 18,2 16,4 16,8   
  Construction 5,0 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,2 6,0   
  Services 68,8 69,2 69,7 70,4 70,5 70,9 70,7 70,4 71,0 72,9 72,8   
  Exports of goods and services 27,1 27,1 25,7 24,6 25,4 25,9 27,7 29,0 28,7 23,8 26,8   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 26,1 25,7 24,8 24,0 24,6 26,0 28,6 29,2 29,4 24,3 28,5   
financial external Trade Balance 0,9 1,4 1,0 0,6 0,7 -0,1 -0,8 -0,2 -0,7 -0,4 -1,8   
position Overall Current Account Balance -0,2 0,2 -0,4 -0,8 -0,3 -0,8 -1,5 -1,2 -2,9 -2,1 -3,5   
  External Investment Net Position -7,2 -5,8 -12,4 -13,6 -15,8 -16,8 -22,2 -24,5 -24,1 -25,3 -24,0 -20,6 
General  Public Deficit -0,9 -3,1 -3,0 -3,5 -3,5 -4,4 -3,3 -1,5 -2,7 -5,4 -4,5 -3,9 
macroeconomic Public Debt 108,5 108,2 105,1 103,9 103,4 105,4 106,1 103,1 105,8 116,1 118,7 120,1 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 3,7 1,9 0,3 0,0 1,7 0,6 2,2 1,7 -1,2 -5,5 1,8 0,3 
(continue) 
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Country\Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Netherlands GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 2,6 2,6 2,3 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,2 2,1 1,8 1,7 1,9   
Sectoral Industry 24,9 24,7 24,1 23,9 23,8 24,2 24,6 24,7 25,6 23,9 23,7   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 19,3 18,9 18,4 18,3 18,5 18,8 19,1 19,1 19,8 17,9 18,4   
Composition Manufacturing 15,6 14,8 14,3 14,1 14,3 14,3 13,9 14,1 13,7 12,6 13,2   
  Construction 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,5 5,4 5,4 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,0 5,3   
  Services 72,4 72,8 73,6 73,8 74,0 73,7 73,2 73,2 72,6 74,4 74,3   
  Exports of goods and services 70,1 67,3 64,2 63,0 66,4 69,6 72,8 74,2 76,3 68,8 78,0   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 64,5 61,5 57,6 56,7 59,0 61,1 65,1 66,0 68,0 62,0 70,6   
financial external Trade Balance 5,5 5,8 6,5 6,3 7,4 8,5 7,7 8,2 8,3 6,8 7,5   
position Overall Current Account Balance 2,0 2,6 2,6 5,5 7,6 7,4 9,3 6,7 4,3 4,2 6,6   
  External Investment Net Position -15,2 -13,4 -24,3 -1,7 3,7 -2,6 3,2 -6,0 4,2 22,1 29,4 41,3 
General  Public Deficit 2,0 -0,3 -2,1 -3,2 -1,8 -0,3 0,4 0,1 0,3 -5,6 -5,1 -5,0 
macroeconomic Public Debt 53,8 50,7 50,5 52,0 52,4 51,8 47,4 45,3 58,5 60,8 62,9 66,2 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 3,9 1,9 0,1 0,2 2,2 2,0 3,4 3,9 1,8 -3,5 1,6 1,3 
Portugal GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 3,6 3,4 3,2 3,1 3,1 2,8 2,7 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4   
Sectoral Industry 28,5 28,2 27,7 26,8 26,3 25,6 25,4 25,3 24,6 23,3 23,5   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 20,3 19,8 19,4 19,0 18,6 18,1 18,2 18,0 17,3 16,8 17,0   
Composition Manufacturing 17,1 16,7 16,2 15,5 15,0 14,6 14,3 14,1 13,7 12,8 13,0   
  Construction 8,2 8,4 8,2 7,7 7,7 7,5 7,3 7,3 7,3 6,5 6,5   
  Services 67,8 68,4 69,1 70,1 70,6 71,7 71,8 72,3 73,0 74,3 74,2   
  Exports of goods and services 29,0 28,1 27,7 27,7 28,1 27,8 31,0 32,2 32,4 28,0 30,9   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 40,0 38,4 36,0 34,5 36,5 37,2 39,7 40,2 42,5 35,5 38,1   
financial external Trade Balance -11,0 -10,3 -8,3 -6,8 -8,3 -9,4 -8,7 -8,0 -10,1 -7,5 -7,2   
position Overall Current Account Balance -10,3 -10,3 -8,2 -6,4 -8,3 -10,3 -10,7 -10,1 -12,6 -10,9 -10,0   
  External Investment Net Position -41,2 -47,5 -54,6 -57,5 -64,1 -66,9 -78,8 -87,9 -96,1 -110,3 -106,1 -102,7 
General  Public Deficit -2,9 -4,3 -2,9 -3,1 -3,4 -5,9 -4,1 -3,2 -3,7 -10,2 -9,8 -4,0 
macroeconomic Public Debt 48,4 51,1 53,7 55,7 57,5 62,5 63,7 68,3 71,6 83,1 93,4 106,8 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 3,9 2,0 0,5 -0,9 1,6 0,5 1,4 2,4 0,0 -2,9 1,4 -1,5 
(continue) 
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Country\Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Spain GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 4,4 4,3 4,0 4,0 3,6 3,2 2,8 2,9 2,7 2,6 2,7   
Sectoral Industry 29,2 29,2 28,9 28,9 29,1 29,7 29,8 29,2 28,4 26,1 25,7   
Structural Mining, manufacturing, utilities 20,9 20,3 19,5 19,0 18,5 18,2 17,8 17,3 17,0 15,3 15,6   
Composition Manufacturing 18,6 18,1 17,3 16,8 16,3 15,8 15,5 15,0 14,5 12,7 13,2   
  Construction 8,3 8,9 9,4 9,9 10,6 11,5 12,1 11,9 11,4 10,8 10,1   
  Services 66,4 66,6 67,0 67,1 67,3 67,1 67,4 67,9 68,9 71,3 71,7   
  Exports of goods and services 29,0 28,5 27,3 26,3 25,9 25,7 26,3 26,9 26,5 23,4 26,3   
Trade and net Imports of goods and services 32,2 31,0 29,5 28,7 29,9 31,0 32,7 33,6 32,2 25,5 28,4   
financial external Trade Balance -3,1 -2,5 -2,1 -2,4 -4,0 -5,3 -6,4 -6,7 -5,8 -2,2 -2,2   
position Overall Current Account Balance -4,0 -3,9 -3,3 -3,5 -5,3 -7,4 -9,0 -10,0 -9,6 -5,2 -4,6   
  External Investment Net Position -32,0 -35,6 -41,6 -45,2 -51,9 -55,6 -65,8 -78,1 -79,3 -93,7 -89,6 -91,6 
General  Public Deficit -1,0 -0,7 -0,5 -0,2 -0,3 0,7 2,0 1,9 -4,2 -11,2 -9,3 -8,5 
macroeconomic Public Debt 59,3 55,6 52,6 48,8 46,3 43,2 39,7 36,3 40,2 53,9 61,2 68,5 
indicators Real GDP growth rate 5,1 3,6 2,7 0,1 3,3 3,6 4,1 3,5 0,6 -3,7 -0,1 0,5 
(continue)
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